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Abstract 
This paper empirically analyzes whether a hypothesis from Aukrust (1977) applies to two phenomena in Japan: wage 
spillover between internationally competitive industries (exposed sectors) and domestically protected industries 
(sheltered sectors), and wage- and price- setting in those industries. We find that Aukrust's assumptions hold in the 
case of Japan, as all three of the cointegrating relations assumed by the Aukrust model are confirmed to exist. We also 
find the causal relations in Japan are more complex than the relations assumed by Aukrust.
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     1 Introduction
This paper tests whether a hypothesis from Aukrust (1977) applies to two phe-
nomena in Japan: wage spillover between internationally competitive industries
(”exposed sectors”) and domestically protected industries (”sheltered sectors”),
and wage- and price- setting in those industries. The traded goods industries
in an open economy are exposed to competition with other countries, and the
prices of those goods are determined by the international market. As a result,
the prices of competitive goods are imposed exogenously. Real wages are equal
to marginal productivity in competitive goods industries, hence nominal wages
are set based on the prices of goods determined by the international market.
Sheltered sectors, on the other hand, are shut oﬀ from international competition
and thus unrestricted by price competition. Yet the movement of labor within
the domestic labor market leads to a convergence of wages in the two sector
groups, hence wages in the exposed sectors can be presumed to lead wages in
the sheltered sectors. The prices of goods in sheltered sectors are determined by
wages as those wages are determined by the labor market. This is the Aukrust
hypothesis.
Japan has both exposed sectors and sheltered sectors, and the labor market
between the two is arguably integrated. Aukrust’s assumptions seem to ﬁt the
Japanese economy closely, and may apply to wage- and price-setting in Japan.
By testing the Aukrust hypothesis we can yield important information on the
wage- and price-setting processes even in the present. For our tests we adopt
recent methods of time series analysis, relying closely on cointegration analysis.
The Aukrust hypothesis can be summed up as two assumptions. First, it
assumes the existence of three cointegrating relations: (i) one among wages,
prices, and labor productivity in exposed sectors; (ii) one between wages in
exposed sectors and wages in sheltered sectors; and (iii) one among wages, prices,
and labor productivity in sheltered sectors. Second, it assumes the existence
of three spillover paths: (i) a causal relation from prices in exposed sectors to
wages in exposed sectors; (ii) a causal relation from wages in exposed sectors
to wages in sheltered sectors; and (iii) a causal relation from wages in sheltered
sectors to prices in sheltered sectors.
Many researchers have recognized the importance of the Aukrust model and
taken the model up as a basis for subsequent study. The works of Frisch (1977)
and Nymoen (1991) are prominent and representative. Friberg (2003) used
causality tests to examine the wage spill-over hypothesis, i.e., to test whether
the exposed sector was a wage leader, in the case of Sweden. The public sector in
his analysis was divided into central government and local government, and the
private sector was divided into (1) manufacturing, (2) construction, (3) whole-
sale and retail, and (4) ﬁnance. Causality tests demonstrated a strong causality
between the two sector groups, but neither of the groups seemed to preponder-
ate as a wage leader. When Holmlund and Ohlsson (1992) and Jacobson and
Ohlsson (1994) searched for wage linkages between the government sector and
private sector (manufacturing), both studies concluded that the private sector
was more of a wage leader than the government sector.
1The wage- and price-setting mechanisms in Japanese competitive goods in-
dustries and non-competitive goods industries are empirically analyzed based
on the speciﬁc characteristics of the Japanese economy in this paper. The anal-
ysis covers four exposed sector industries (transport machinery, iron & steel,
chemicals, and metals) and one sheltered sector industry (electricity & gas). A
well recognized feature of the Japanese economy is the coexistence of indus-
tries exposed to ﬁerce international competition from overseas (e.g., transport
machinery, iron & steel, chemicals, and metals) and industries sheltered by im-
pediments to entry (e.g., electricity & gas).
This paper focuses on the relationships of both causality and cointegration.
Speciﬁcally, we ask three questions: whether Aukrust’s assumptions hold on
either basis, whether the cointegrating relations diﬀer from those assumed by
Aukrust, and whether we can simultaneously identify cointegrating relations
consistent with those assumed by Aukrust and causality relationships diﬀerent
from those assumed by Aukrust.
The main conclusions drawn from our study can be condensed into two
points. First, we can assert that Aukrust’s assumptions hold in the case of
Japan, as all three of the cointegrating relations assumed by the Aukrust model
are conﬁrmed to exist. Second, we ﬁnd that the causal relations in Japan are
more complex than the relations assumed by Aukrust. In the case of wages,
for example, we encounter a bidirectional causality between the exposed and
sheltered sectors, rather than a one-way spillover from the latter to the former.
As previously demonstrated in the study by Friberg (2003), our result indicates
that neither of the sector groups can be described as a wage leader. Our ﬁndings
also suggest that the exposed sectors have pricing power even in international
markets. If this is so, competitive Japanese companies cannot be characterized
as the ”price-taking” entities proposed in the Aukrust model. It thus appears
that wages in the two sector groups are inﬂuenced by a wider variety of variables
than assumed by Aukrust.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the
Aukrust hypothesis; Section 3 introduces the data used in the paper; Section 4
presents the demonstration results; and Section 5 outlines the conclusions.
2 Aukrust’s main-course model
Aukrust (1997) analyzes the processes of wage- and price-setting by establish-
ing a two-sector model comprised of sectors exposed to international competi-
tion (”exposed sectors”) and sectors protected from international competition
(”sheltered sectors”) in a small, open economy. Companies in exposed sectors
produce competitive goods, while companies in sheltered sectors produce non-
competitive goods. The market for non-competitive goods is protected by the
national government or by high costs, leading to conditions which heighten the
impediments to entry. The product prices in a market for non-competitive goods
are determined on the basis of the mark-ups on top of wage costs.
2The model developed by Aukrust (1977) can be speciﬁed as follows:
pe;t = gf + pe;t¡1 + v1;t (1)
ae;t = gae + ae;t¡1 + v2;t (2)
we;t ¡ pe;t ¡ ae;t = me + v3;t (3)
ws;t = we;t + v4;t (4)
as;t = gse + as;t¡1 + v5;t (5)
ws;t ¡ ps;t ¡ as;t = ms + v6;t (6)
where we;t is the nominal wage of a ﬁrm in E-sector at time t; pe;t is the output
price of a ﬁrm in E-sector at time t; ae;t is the average labor productivity of
a ﬁrm in E-sector at time t; ws;t is the nominal wage of a ﬁrm in S-sector at
time t; ps;t is the output price of a ﬁrm in S-sector at time t; as;t is the average
labor productivity of a ﬁrm in S-sector at time t; gi(i = f;ae;as) is the constant
growth rate; mi(i = e;s) is the wage share of the i-th ﬁrm; vi(i = 1;:::;6) are the
stationary error terms. The suﬃces e and s indicate the E-sector and S-sector,
respectively, and all of the variables are expressed in logarithms.
It follows from Eqs. (3), (4) and (6) that we obtain theoretical cointegrating
and causal relations. For the causality, we obtain,
we;t ¡ pe;t ¡ ae;t = c1 + ²1 » I(0); (7)
ws;t ¡ we;t = c2 + ²2 » I(0); (8)
ws;t ¡ ps;t ¡ as;t = c3 + ²3 » I(0): (9)
For causality, we obtain
pe;t ¡! we;t; (10)
we;t ¡! ws;t; (11)
ws;t ¡! ps;t; (12)
where ²i(i = 1;2;3) are disturbances.
3 Data
The analysis in this paper uses monthly Japanese data from January 1988 to
December 2005. Manufacturing is taken as an example of an exposed sector
and services are taken as an example of a sheltered sector. Manufacturing is
represented by four industries: transport machinery, iron & steel, chemicals,
and metals. The service sector is represented by electricity & gas.
The industrial production index is obtained from Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry. The domestic producer’s price index is obtained from Bank
of Japan. Wage and employment data are obtained from the Japan Institute
for Labor Policy and Training.
3Automaking, iron and steel, chemicals, and metals are all industries subject
to competition. The auto industry, which is included under transport machin-
ery, is one of Japan’s most competitive industries. Iron and steel represents
heavy industry and is amply competitive due in part to competition with for-
eign companies. Chemicals and metals can also be considered competitive. As
competition takes place in all four industries, they can be analyzed as exposed
sectors.
Electricity and gas are regional monopolies in Japan, and domestic demand
is covered by domestic production. Electricity & gas thus face no competition
as an industry and can be analyzed as a sheltered sector.
Hence, we analyzed the following four cases:
² Case 1: (Exposed sector, Sheltered sector) = (transport machinery, elec-
tricity & gas)
² Case 2: (Exposed sector, Sheltered sector) = (iron & steel, electricity &
gas)
² Case 3: (Exposed sector, Sheltered sector) = (chemicals, electricity & gas)
² Case 4: (Exposed sector, Sheltered sector) = (metals, electricity & gas)
Output levels were measured by indexes of industrial production and tertiary
industry activity. Prices were measured by a price index for domestic corporate
goods (excluding the consumption tax), wages were measured by an index of
total cash earnings, and the number of employees was calculated based on the
employment index of regular workers. The seasonal adjustments for output,




To examine whether Aukrust’s main-course model of wage-setting and price-
setting applies to the Japanese economy, we analyze the cointegrating relation
expressed by Eqs. (7), (8) and (9).
First, and ADF test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979), PP test (Phillips and Perron,
1988), DF-GLS test (Elliott et al, 1996) and KPSS (Kwiatkowski et al, 1992)
test are performed to analyze if each variable has a unit root. The lag length is
chosen using an AIC with a maximum length of 6. As Table 1 indicates, each
variable is likely to have a unit root.
Having found that each variable has a I(1) process, we now move on to the
cointegration analysis among variables. Given that the cointegration vector is
theoretically known, suﬃcient information can be collected by carrying out a
unit root test on (we;t ¡ pe;t ¡ ae;t), (ws;t ¡ we;t) and (ws;t ¡ ps;t ¡ as;t). The
ADF test and Phillips-Perron test are applied for this purpose. The empirical
4results shown in Table 2 support the cointegrating relation for each of the four
cases (Case 1 through Case 4). Here, we adopt the result of PP test from
the problem of power. Thus, our results on Japan support three cointegrating
relations from the Aukrust hypothesis. Furthermore, we implement Exp-F test
to check a structural change (Andrews and Ploberger, 1994). This test is known
to be more powerful test against distant local alternatives. This tests for the
null of parameter constancy against the alternative that regression coeﬃcients
change at an unknown date. The ﬁrst and last 15 The lag length is chosen using
an AIC with a maximum length of 12. From table 2, it is found that the null
hypothesis of no structural change is accepter for every case.
Next, we perform the Johansen test for the six variables ⅊we;t, ws;t, pe;t,
ps;t, ae;t, and as;t) to reinforce our empirical results. The lag length of the
vector error correction model is selected using the AIC. As shown in Table 3,
the cointegrating rank is equal to three for each case. Judging from Tables 2
and 3, the three cointegrating relations implied by Aukrust’s main-course model
appear to hold in Japan.
4.2 Causality
Next we analyze the causal relations shown by Eqs. (10), (11) and (12). To
consider this problem, we estimate the following vector error correction model
(VECM):
∆yt = ®ECt¡1 + Σ
p¡1





we;t ¡ pe;t ¡ ae;t
ws;t ¡ we;t
ws;t ¡ ps;t ¡ as;t
3
5 (14)
where yt = fwe;t;ws;t;pe;t;ps;t;ae;t;as;tg0, ut is a vector of disturbances, ® is a
vector of adjustment coeﬃcients, and ¯ is a 6£3 cointegrating vector. The lag
length of the VAR(p) model is chosen using the AIC.
We consider the causality by focusing on the vector of adjustment coeﬃcients

















The wage of each industry is given by,
∆we;t = ®11(we ¡ pe ¡ ae)t¡1
+®12(ws ¡ we)t¡1 + ®13(ws ¡ ps ¡ as)t¡1 + :::: (16)
∆ws;t = ®21(we ¡ pe ¡ ae)t¡1
+®22(ws ¡ we)t¡1 + ®23(ws ¡ ps ¡ as)t¡1 + :::: (17)
5According to the Aukrust hypothesis, the wage in competitive industries is
inﬂuenced by the world output price, but not by the wage in domestic protected
industries. Thus, we obtain,
®11 6= 0; ®12 = 0; ®13 = 0: (18)
Additionally, the wage movements in protected industries are adjustments to
reduce the disparity from the wage in competitive industries. Thus, we obtain
®21 = 0; ®22 6= 0; ®23 = 0: (19)
The price-setting equation in domestic protected industries is shown by,
∆ps;t = ®41(we ¡ pe ¡ ae)t¡1 + ®42(ws ¡ we)t¡1 + ®43(ws ¡ ps ¡ as)t¡1 + :::: (20)
Given the wage and technical progress, the prices presumably move as ad-
justments to reduce the disparity, as follows:
®41 = 0; ®42 = 0; ®43 6= 0: (21)
From Eqs. (1), (2) and (5), the technical progress in two industries (∆ae;t;∆as;t)
and the output price in competitive industries (∆pe;t) are unit root processes,
and thus given exogenously. In summary, the coeﬃcients implied by the Aukrust





















Next, we estimate the vector of adjustment coeﬃcients and compare the
results with the results expected under the Aukrust theory. As the cointegrating
vector of each equation is known, the VECM can be estimated using OLS instead
of the maximum likelihood method. It thus suﬃces to estimate Eq. (13) for
Cases 1 through 4.
Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7 report the OLS estimates of adjustment coeﬃcients
corresponding to Case l, Case 2, Case 3, and Case 4. Note that the tables omit
results for lagged and constant terms.
First, let us consider the empirical results of coeﬃcients ®11, ®22 and ®43.
The coeﬃcient of wage determination in competitive industries, ®11, is statis-
tically signiﬁcant for Case l, Case 2, and Case 4. The coeﬃcient to adjust the
disparity between the wage in domestic protected industries and the wage in
competitive industries, ®22, is statistically signiﬁcant for Case 1, Case 3, and
Case 4. These results are consistent with the Aukrust model. We also ﬁnd,
1Strictly speaking, j®ijj = 1 because of the instantaneously adjustment, hence the VAR in
ﬁrst diﬀerences becomes zero.
6however, that the coeﬃcients of price determination in protected industries,
®41, ®42, and ®43, lack statistical signiﬁcance. This ﬁnding is inconsistent with
the Aukrust model.
Given that ®12 and ®22 are statistically signiﬁcant for Case l, Case 3, and
Case 4, the wages in both industry groups move to adjust the wage disparity.
Speciﬁcally, ®12 is statistically signiﬁcant in all cases, hence neither of the in-
dustry groups can be singled out as the wage leader. The coeﬃcients of wage
adjustment in competitive and protected industries, ®13 and ®31, are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant in most cases, hence a causal relation from prices to wages can
be conﬁrmed. The coeﬃcient of adjustment, ®31, is statistically signiﬁcant in
every case, hence the prices of traded goods are set to adjust the disparity of
real wages.
These ﬁndings conﬁrm the existence of a unilateral causal relation from one
industry group to the other, just as Aukrust’s main-course model assumes.
5 Conclusions
This paper empirically analyzed whether the empirical hypotheses proposed by
Aukrust (1977) applies to Japan.
First, we conﬁrmed that Aukrust’s three cointegrating relations hold for
Japan. As the Aukrust (1977) model asserts, long-run relationships can be
identiﬁed in the wages, prices and labor productivity of exposed sectors; in the
wages of exposed sectors and wages of sheltered sectors; and in the wages, prices,
and labor productivity of sheltered sectors.
Second, we obtained spill-over paths that diﬀered overall from the spill-over
paths asserted in the Aukrust (1977) model. The results of our analysis seemed
to point to the following directionality in spill-over eﬀects: (1) the wages of
sheltered sectors and wages of exposed sectors impact each other; (2) the prices
of sheltered sectors impact the wages of sheltered sectors; and (3) the wages of
exposed sectors and the prices of exposed sectors impact each other. Overall,
there was no evidence to suggest that the wages in sheltered sectors impacted
the prices in sheltered sectors.
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8Table 1: Unit root test
industry ADF PP DF-GLS KPSS
electricity & gas -4.097** -3.321* 1.565 1.556**
transport machinery -3.348* -2.556 1.244 1.633**
w iron & steel -3.101* -10.868** 0.952 1.095**
chemicals ℡℡℡℡℡ -3.590** -3.551** 1.853 1.652**
metals -4.477** -4.664** 0.634 0.970**
electricity & gas -0.437 -0.475 1.036 1.716**
transport machinery 0.616 2.449 1.204 1.762**
p iron & steel -1.927 -0.538 -1.582 0.725*
chemicals -1.304 -1.227 -1.109 0.890**
metals -1.105 -1.106 -0.860 0.978**
electricity & gas 0.010 -0.171 2.985 1.854**
transport machinery -0.806 -2.179 0.022 1.238**
a iron & steel -1.053 -0.567 -0.233 1.617**
chemicals -0.986 -1.047 1.544 1.851**
metals -3.010* -5.839** -2.546* 0.124
electricity & gas -10.731** -46.305** -5.162** 0.461
transport machinery -9.405** -40.901** -2.963** 0.310
∆w iron & steel -14.167** -52.770** -0.983 0.156
chemicals -12.700** -47.434** -0.799 0.399
metals -12.164** -43.202** -0.668 0.501*
electricity & gas -14.397** -14.402** -13.496** 0.059
transport machinery -3.142* -12.580** -2.534* 0.897**
∆p iron & steel -2.833 -6.303** -1.493 0.622*
chemicals -5.236** -10.490** -4.790** 0.406
metals -8.974** -9.039** -3.720** 0.305
electricity & gas -13.645** -30.120** -0.961 0.118
transport machinery -24.931** -26.390** -1.077 0.111
∆a iron & steel -4.178** -14.922** -1.004 0.084
chemicals -23.178** -23.337** -23.138** 0.035
metals -7.779** -25.371** -1.098 0.040
Note: ** (*) indicates signiﬁcance at 1% (5%).
9Table 2: Cointegration test
Industry PP test ADF test Exp-F test
Case 1) (we;t ¡ pe;t ¡ ae;t) -3.115** -2.409* 0.421
(ws;t ¡ we;t) -13.436** -2.498* 0.384
(ws;t ¡ ps;t ¡ as;t) -6.815** -0.697 0.504
Case 2) (we;t ¡ pe;t ¡ ae;t) -2.967** -0.663 1.374
(ws;t ¡ we;t) -10.145** -0.944 1.004
(ws;t ¡ ps;t ¡ as;t) - - -
Case 3) (we;t ¡ pe;t ¡ ae;t) -3.080** -0.799 0.630
(ws;t ¡ we;t) -14.760** -2.344* 0.479
(ws;t ¡ ps;t ¡ as;t) - - -
Case 4) (we;t ¡ pe;t ¡ ae;t) -3.531** -2.470* 0.485
(ws;t ¡ we;t) -11.432** -1.261 0.600
(ws;t ¡ ps;t ¡ as;t) - - -
Note: PP test and ADF test are unit root test. Exp-F test is a structural change test.
Test statistics of (ws;t ¡ ps;t ¡ as;t) are the same for all four cases.
** (*) indicates signiﬁcance at 1% (5%).
Table 3: Cointegration rank tests
null hypothesis
(trace tests) Case 1) Case 2) Case 3) Case 4)
r = 0 165.966** 202.196** 204.785** 128.197**
r · 1 100.054** 111.507** 95.114** 75.855*
r · 2 56.034** 62.993** 49.735* 48.148*
r · 3 22.486 28.217 25.644 27.368
r · 4 10.663 9.980 9.061 9.081
r · 5 1.437 3.038 3.389 0.123
null hypothesis
(max-eigenvalue tests) Case 1) Case 2) Case 3) Case 4)
r = 0 65.912** 90.690** 109.671** 52.342**
r · 1 44.021** 48.513** 45.380** 27.707
r · 2 33.548** 34.776** 24.090 20.780
r · 3 11.823 18.237 16.584 18.287
r · 4 9.226 6.942 5.672 8.959
r · 5 1.437 3.038 3.389 0.123
Note: ** (*) indicates signiﬁcance at 1% (5%).
10Table 4: The estimation result of ®: Case 1)
(we ¡ pe ¡ ae) (ws ¡ we) (ws ¡ ps ¡ as)
∆we;t -0.054** 0.447** -0.092*
p-value (0.005) (0.000) (0.024)
∆ws;t -0.011 -0.311** 0.027
p-value (0.513) (0.001) (0.423)
∆pe;t -0.002* -0.009 0.007*
p-value (0.027) (0.169) (0.027)
∆ps;t -0.004 0.013 0.006
p-value (0.558) (0.661) (0.575)
∆ae;t 0.050* 0.029 -0.041
p-value (0.049) (0.834) (0.394)
∆as:t -0.006 -0.161 0.083
p-value (0.700) (0.105) (0.067)
Note: ** (*) indicates signiﬁcance at 1% (5%).
Table 5: The estimation result of ®: Case 2)
(we ¡ pe ¡ ae) (ws ¡ we) (ws ¡ ps ¡ as)
∆we;t -0.155* 0.394** 0.379*
p-value (0.015) (0.001) (0.028)
∆ws;t 0.056* -0.062 -0.165*
p-value (0.042) (0.065) (0.029)
∆pe;t -0.009* 0.004 -0.008
p-value (0.045) (0.360) (0.355)
∆ps;t -0.006 -0.006 0.024
p-value (0.314) (0.473) (0.114)
∆ae;t 0.024 0.042* -0.002
p-value (0.088) (0.015) (0.960)
∆as:t -0.060** -0.005 0.176**
p-value (0.001) (0.838) (0.000)
Note: ** (*) indicates signiﬁcance at 1% (5%).
11Table 6: The estimation result of ®: Case 3)
(we ¡ pe ¡ ae) (ws ¡ we) (ws ¡ ps ¡ as)
∆we;t -0.040 0.602** -0.077
p-value (0.265) (0.000) (0.225)
∆ws;t 0.083** -0.348* -0.119**
p-value (0.002) (0.014) (0.009)
∆pe;t -0.018** 0.011 0.004
p-value (0.009) (0.427) (0.647)
∆ps;t -0.007 -0.024 0.019
p-value (0.442) (0.381) (0.134)
∆ae;t 0.059* -0.017 -0.027
p-value (0.037) (0.782) (0.503)
∆as:t -0.007 -0.024 0.019
p-value (0.442 ) (0.381 ) (0.134 )
Note: ** (*) indicates signiﬁcance at 1% (5%).
Table 7: The estimation result of ®: Case 4)
(we ¡ pe ¡ ae) (ws ¡ we) (ws ¡ ps ¡ as)
∆we;t -0.077** 0.170* 0.149**
p-value (0.001) (0.039) (0.009)
∆ws;t -0.007 -0.309** -0.157**
p-value (0.732) (0.000) (0.001)
∆pe;t -0.006** -0.001 -0.006
p-value (0.009) (0.824) (0.176)
∆ps;t -0.003 0.011 0.019
p-value (0.682) (0.527) (0.136)
∆ae;t 0.014 0.057 0.050
p-value (0.410) (0.250) (0.145)
∆as:t -0.021 0.065 0.045
p-value (0.277) (0.445) (0.429)
Note: ** (*) indicates signiﬁcance at 1% (5%).
12